Abstract illustration of a trusted glowing cube feeding hidden amber code into many web pages, representing a third-party script supply-chain attack

Most third-party risk reviews ask whether a vendor can be breached. On 16 November, visitors to 178 organisations’ websites got an answer to a different question: what happens when a trusted vendor’s script is changed and nothing on your own site is touched?

According to Report URI’s technical analysis, an attacker wrote a loader into the Project JavaScript field of Optimizely Web Experimentation customer projects. That is the custom code customers add in their Optimizely dashboard, and it runs on every page that loads the snippet. The rest of each snippet was untouched, and it was still served from cdn.optimizely.com, a host every affected site already trusted. The list includes Zoom, the BBC, CNN and HSBC. The payload swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses, skimmed card details typed into sites’ own forms, sent cookies and screenshots to the attacker, and loaded the Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits on iPhones and iPads. Report URI traced about US$7,040 to the attacker’s wallets, but says it cannot see how many cards, cookies or devices were hit.

Optimizely’s incident notice says an unauthorized party “exploited a vulnerability in Experimentation” to add the code, and that the flaw is fixed and the code removed. As reported by Search Engine Journal, the company told BleepingComputer the flaw was in the account signup flow, and that it ended active sessions, revoked tokens and reset access for affected accounts. How a signup flaw gave write access to unrelated customers’ projects hasn’t been explained yet.

The bigger lesson is that this was an identity and access failure that surfaced as a web attack. Whoever could write to those projects could run code in the browser of every visitor to those sites, with the full trust of a well-known domain. Report URI’s look at the victims’ Content Security Policies makes the point: 68 organisations had none, 50 had one that allowed both the payload and the data theft, and only 24 (15%) blocked the payload outright. Allowing cdn.optimizely.com did nothing, because the code came from that host. For APAC banks and retailers, marketing and experimentation tags often sit on login and checkout pages, and the accounts that control them are usually owned by marketing teams, not security. That makes them production code with weaker governance.

What security leaders should do:

  • If you use Optimizely Web, follow Report URI’s checks: review every project’s Project JavaScript and experiment code for anything your team didn’t write, including atob( calls.
  • Review who and what can write to tag, testing and analytics accounts (users, API tokens, integrations) and rotate the credentials.
  • Treat cards typed into your own forms on 16 November, and secrets in non-HttpOnly cookies, as possibly exposed.
  • Deploy a CSP with a restrictive script-src and connect-src, and avoid ‘unsafe-eval’ where you can.
  • Keep third-party tags off login and payment pages, and take cards through the payment provider’s hosted fields.

Your website is only as trustworthy as the least-guarded account that can change what it runs.

Disclaimer: This post was researched and written by AI agents working with Philip Sow. Every source is linked so you can check the facts. Views are personal and do not represent any employer.

#SupplyChainSecurity #WebSecurity #APAC #CyberSecurity

Sources: Report URI: World’s Largest Brands Infected With Malware Via Optimizely (16 Nov) · Optimizely status: Web Experimentation Security Incident · Search Engine Journal (17 Nov)

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